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Abstract
We characterize the equilibrium in a homogeneous good Cournot
duopoly in which rms have the choice to react to a cost-push shock
by paying a lump-sum adjustment cost in order to o¤set the initial
rise in marginal cost. Our results show that the size of the shock and
the size of the adjustment cost jointly determine the nature and the
number of the equilibria generated in the game. In particular, if the
adjustment cost is high enough, at least one rm decides not to adjust
at the pure strategy equilibrium, and such a partial adjustment by
the industry can be socially e¢ cient as well. Some implications of this
partial equilibrium analysis about an industryresilience are outlined.
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1 Introduction
How do oligopolistic rms react to an exogenous cost-push shock when they
have a chance to undertake a costly action to o¤set it? The question is rele-
vant as rms challenged by a loss in competitiveness induced by an increase
in production costs are increasingly induced to restore the pre-shock level
of protability by acting on other parts of the cost structure, rather than
revising their pricing policy. Actions of this nature are seldom costless.
We propose an analysis of this issue in a simple Cournot duopoly model
a¤ected by a shock increasing the level of marginal cost by the same amount
for both rms, each of which has to evaluate the protability of spending
a xed amount of resources to bring back its marginal cost to the initial
level, in a fully noncooperative game. Intuitively, the equilibrium outcome
depends on the level of the adjustment cost, and the rms incentives to
undertake this costly venture fade away as it increases. In particular, there
exists an intermediate range of values of the adjustment cost in which two
asymmetric equilibria obtain in pure strategies, such that one rm adjusts
while the other doesnt. Interestingly enough, such asymmetry may indeed
turn out to be aligned with social preferences, so that a government would
raise no objection to an equilibrium outcome characterised by asymmetric
levels of productive e¢ ciency and investments.
After carrying out the analysis of the duopoly model, we propose di¤erent
interpretations of the source and nature of the cost-push shock as well as
the reaction to it, linking the ensuing partial equilibrium analysis typically
belonging to the theory of industrial organization to far-reaching discussions
about the inuence of labour unions on rms innovation incentives (Ulph
and Ulph, 1998), the neoclassical adjustment mechanism to the long-run
equilibrium after a permanent demand shock (Woodford, 2003) and resilience
(Lee et al., 2013).
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2 The model
The economy is composed by two identical rms (indexed by i = 1; 2) produc-
ing a homogeneous good. Consider a time horizon consisting of three periods,
t  1; t and t+ 1: At time t  1; demand and cost functions are respectively
p = a Q = a q1 q2 and Ci = cqi, where p denotes the price of the product
and qi is rm is quantity. Marginal cost is given by parameter c 2 (0; a).
Firms play à la Cournot-Nash, and therefore individual prots at time t  1
read  (t  1) = (a  c)2 =9: Then, between t   1 and t (say, overnight),
the industry is hit by an exogenous shock shifting the marginal cost1 up to
c 2 (c; a) and individual prots down to  (t) = (a  c)2 =9 <  (t  1) : Now
assume the existence of a symmetric lump-sum adjustment cost k > 0 that,
if paid by the rm, is going to restore the initial level of the marginal cost
and therefore also prots (net of k) at time t + 1. In other words, rms
may implement a costly action so as to o¤set the initial increase in marginal
cost from c to c. There are many ways we can rationalize such a cost: R&D
activities for a process innovation measured by c  c; or a bargaining process
aimed at reducing input costs (labor, capital or raw materials), assuming
they are exchanged in non-competitive markets. For our purpose, all that
matters is that such a reaction to the shock is costly. If both rms decide to
implement the reaction after the marginal cost shock has occurred, then at
t+ 1 individual prots are given by the following expression:
AA =
(a  c)2
9
  k =  (t  1)  k (1)
where superscript AA mnemonics for symmetric adjustment. Prots AA are
positive for all
k 2  0; kAA ; kAA = (a  c)2
9
(2)
1For the sake of simplicity, we are focussing on a shock a¤ecting marginal cost, but the
ensuing analysis would go through unmodied if we instead assumed the shock to decrease
demand. That is, a simple reformulation of market size a  c =  would allow us to model
a shock driving market size down from  to , with entirely analogous results.
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For any k > kAA; the size of the shock is large enough to eliminate any
incentive for rms to carry out the symmetric adjustment.
If both rms decide instead not to adjust, then prots remain at the level
identied by  (t), and can be usefully relabelled as
NN =
(a  c)2
9
(3)
where superscript NN indicates that neither rm is adjusting.
In case of asymmetric adjustment, we identify with superscript A the
rm which, after the cost-push shock, decides to pay k to bring its marginal
cost back to the initial level c; and with superscript NA the rm which does
not. In order for the industry to remain a duopoly with both rms selling
positive output levels, we impose the condition c 2 (c; (a+ c) =2). Borrowing
from the jargon typical of the literature on the economics of innovation, this
assumption entails that the shock is minor, or non-drastic.2 Asymmetric
equilibrium prots are the following:
AN =
(a  2c+ c)2
9
  k (4)
NA =
(a  2c+ c)2
9
(5)
For all c 2 (c; (a+ c) =2) ; (5) is strictly positive. The positivity of (4) is
ensured for all
k 2  0; kAN ; kAN = (a  2c+ c)2
9
> 0 as c < c (6)
This condition provides an upper bound on the size of the adjustment cost
in the asymmetric case; if it is violated, no rm will unilaterally undertake
the adjustment.
Having now fully characterised the spectrum of market subgames and
their outcomes, we may design a reduced-form representation of the game
2See, for instance, the debate on the persistence of monopoly (Gilbert and Newbery,
1982; Reinganum, 1983), where the same asymmetric Cournot duopoly is used to assess
whether an incumbent may invest more than a potential entrant in order to keep monopoly
power. For more, see Tirole (1988).
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following the rise in marginal cost, where each rm has to decide whether to
adjust or not to the cost-push shock, i.e., whether to pay k and bring back
marginal costs to c. Such a reduced form is represented by Matrix 1 dened in
the binary space of discrete strategies (A;N) ; and denes a noncooperative
game with complete, symmetric and imperfect information (i.e., rms move
simultaneously).
2
A NA
1 A AA; AA AN ; NA
N NA; AN NN ; NN
Matrix 1
The equilibrium outcome(s) and Pareto-e¢ ciency (whenever the latter
property is indeed relevant) are determined by the signs of the following
expressions:
AN   NN = (a  2c+ c)
2
9
  k   (a  c)
2
9
(7)
AA   NA = (a  c)
2
9
  k   (a  2c+ c)
2
9
(8)
AA   NN = (a  c)
2
9
  k   (a  c)
2
9
(9)
Expression (7) measures the incentive for a rm to pay the adjustment
cost k when the rival does not react to the cost-push shock. If it is positive
then the rm unilaterally adjusts, otherwise it doesnt. Expression (8) tells
us whether for either rm it is convenient to reduce marginal cost to its pre-
shock level when also the rival does, and this happens only if the r.h.s. is
positive. Finally, expression (9) allows to Pareto-rank the symmetric payo¤s
appearing along the main diagonal of Matrix 1. If it is positive, the symmetric
adjustment is always Pareto-superior to the symmetric lack thereof.
It can be easily checked that (7) is positive for all k 2  0; k ; where:
k =
4 (a  c) (c  c)
9
(10)
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Expression (8) is positive for all k 2

0;ek ; where:
ek = 4 (a  c) (c  c)
9
(11)
Finally, (9) is positive for all k 2

0;bk ; where:
bk = (2a  c  c)(c  c)
9
(12)
The characterization of the equilibrium of the game is therefore given by
the size of the adjustment cost k with respect to the three above thresholds.
According to that, in fact, expressions (7)-(9) assume di¤erent signs and
consequently give rise to di¤erent strategic interactions outcome. Before
analysing that issue, it is necessary to order k1; k2 and k3; as we do in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 k > ek > bk for any a > c > c:
Proof. Since c > c; k is obviously higher than ek. Also, we know thatek   bk = (2a + c   3c)(c   c)=9 > 0 as c > c and, the cost di¤erential being
non-drastic, c 2 (c; (a+ c) =2) to ensure the non-negativity of outputs in
the asymmetric cases. Finally, k > bk is ensured by the fact that k   bk =
(2a  3c+ c)(c  c)=9 > 0 because a > c > c.
Additionally, it is obvious that kAN > kAA > ek > bk for all a > c > c;
with
lim
c!a+c
2
kAA = ek; (13)
while comparing kAA and k one nds the following:
Lemma 2 kAA > k for all c 2 (c; (a+ 3c) =4) : The opposite holds for all
c 2 ((a+ 3c) =4; a) :
Having established that, we are ready to characterize the equilibrium
according to the size of the adjustment cost. This is done in Figure 1, drawingn
k;ek;bk; kAA; kANo in the space (c; k) : Taking into account constraints (2)
and (6), the admissible parameter range is identied by k 2  0; kAA. This
allows us to identify four di¤erent areas:
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 Area I, in which k 2

0;bk : Here, AA > NA; AN > NN and
AA > NN :
 Area II, in which k 2
bk;ek : Here, AA > NA; AN > NN and
AA < NN :
 Area III, in which k 2
ek;mink; kAA	 : Here, AA < NA and AN >
NN :
 Area IV, in which k 2  k; kAA and c 2 ((a+ 3c) =4; a) : Here, AA <
NA; AN < NN and AA < NN :
Figure 1 Equilibrium analysis in the space (c; k).
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On these basis, we may formulate:
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Proposition 3 Depending on the level of the adjustment cost k, the equilib-
rium outcome of the reduced-form game presented in Matrix 1 is the following:
 In area I, (A;A) is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium at the intersec-
tion of dominant strategies, and it is Pareto-e¢ cient for rms.
 In area II, (A;A) is again the unique pure-strategy equilibrium at the
intersection of dominant strategies, but it is Pareto-e¢ cient as Matrix
1 portrays a prisonersdilemma.
 In area III, Matrix 1 is a chicken game with two pure-strategy equilibria
along the secondary diagonal, (A;NA) and (NA;A).
 In area IV, (NA;NA) is the unique pure-strategy equilibrium at the
intersection of dominant strategies, and it is Pareto-e¢ cient for rms.
The intuitive interpretation of Proposition 3 is straightforward: as the
reaction to the cost-push shock becomes more costly, rms obviously are less
inclined to undertake the investment required to bring marginal cost back to
its initial level, and this makes it harder for the industry to symmetrically
adjust as k increases. In the range k 2
ek;mink; kAA	 ; the industry may
do so taking into consideration the equilibrium in mixed strategies, which
becomes relevant in presence of the two pure-strategy equilibria generated
by the chicken game. Having dealt with rmsprot incentives, we have to
assess the social welfare consequences of adjustment (or the lack thereof), in
order to ascertain (i) whether it is socially desirable, and, if so, (ii) whether
prot and social incentives are reciprocally aligned or not.
3 Welfare appraisal
Social welfare is dened as the sum of industry prots and consumer surplus.
In each of the three relevant cases under consideration, the social welfare
level is
SWAA = 2AA + CSAA =
4 (a  c)2
9
  2k (14)
8
SWNN = 2NN + CSNN =
4 (a  c)2
9
(15)
SWNA = SWAN = AN + NA + CSNA (16)
=
(a  2c+ c)2
9
+
(a  2c+ c)2
9
  k + (2a  c  c)
2
9
It is worth noting that the above expressions are strictly positive for all
k 2  0; kAA and all c 2 (c; (a+ 3c) =4) since in this region prots are strictly
positive. From expressions (14-16), we obtain the following:
SWAA > SWNA 8 k 2  0; kSW  ; kSW = (c  c) (8a  11c+ 3c)18 (17)
SWNA > SWNN 8 k 2  0; kSW  ; kSW = (c  c) (8a+ 3c  11c)18 (18)
SWAA > SWNN 8 k 2  0; kSW  ; kSW = 2 (c  c) (2a  c  c)9 (19)
and it is quickly established that kSW > k
SW
 > k
SW
 for all c 2 (c; (a+ 3c) =4) :
This exercise gives rise to the picture represented in Figure 2, with four rel-
evant areas:
 Area A, in which k 2  0; kSW  : Here, SWAA > SWNA > SWNN :
 Area B, in which k 2  kSW ; kSW  : Here, SWNA > SWAA > SWNN :
 Area C, in which k 2  kSW ; kSW  : Here, SWNA > SWNN > SWAA:
 Area D, in which k 2  kSW ; kAA : Here, SWNN > SWNA > SWAA:
Accordingly, we may formulate:
Proposition 4 Depending on the level of the adjustment cost k, social pref-
erences can be summarised as follows:
 In area A, symmetric adjustment by the entire industry is socially e¢ -
cient.
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 In areas B and C, asymmetric adjustment by a single rm is socially
e¢ cient.
 In area D, it is socially e¢ cient that neither rm adjusts.
Figure 2 Welfare analysis in the space (c; k).
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As for rmsincentives, also here we see that - not surprisingly - symmet-
ric adjustment is e¢ cient provided that k is su¢ ciently low. The last step
consists in tackling the issue of the alignment between private and social
incentives. This task can be performed putting together all of the critical
threshold of k in a single graph. This is done in Figure 3, revealing that
there exist three areas wherein alignment does emerge:
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 In area () ; identied by k 2

0;min
nbk; kSW o ; the unique equi-
librium (A;A) involving adjustment by the entire industry is Pareto-
e¢ cient for rms as well as from a social standpoint.
 In area () ; asymmetric adjustment by a single rm is the outcome
of the chicken game, and is also socially optimal.
 In area (  ) ; (N;N) ; i.e., no adjustment by either rm, is the unique
equilibrium generated by rmsstrategic interplay and is also socially
e¢ cient.
Figure 3 Private and social incentives in the space (c; k).
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4 Implications and concluding remarks
In the foregoing exposition, we did not elaborate on the source of the shock
a¤ecting rmsmarginal cost. This can be generated by scal policy actions
(such as increase in tax rates on production or inputs) or institutional features
(labor unionsdemands causing an increase in real wage). Or, additionally, it
may be the outcome of an increase in the cost (or scarcity) of raw materials
or fossil fuels, with analogous consequences. Adopting a wider perspective
ranging far outside the boundaries of partial equilibrium analysis, the role
played by cost-push shocks has indeed received a great deal of attention in
the macroeconomic literature (see Ravenna and Walsh, 2006; Chowdhury
et al., 2006; Henzerl, 2009). If these motives lie behind the marginal cost
increase, then the adjustment cost required to bring it back to its initial level
can be interpreted as either an R&D investment or the cost implied by the
bargaining process between rms and labor unions to reach an agreement on
the reconstruction of the status quo ante.3
Furthermore, the simple model laid out in this note might paves the way
for an introductory theoretical treatment of the resilience issue that is, having
been borrowed from physics, is currently attracting an increasing amount
of attention in economics. Adopting the interpretation according to which
resilience is a systems capacity to bounce back from a shock to its previous
state (cf. Martin and Sunley, 2014), our analysis shows that (i) resilience is
not necessarily to be expected to emerge because rms may not be willing to
carry out the required costly e¤orts, and more importantly (ii) that resilience
may neither be socially desirable, for the very same reason.
3Alternatively, the objectives and actions of labor unions may a¤ect rmsinnovation
incentives. See Ulph and Ulph (1998), Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002); Haucap
and Wey (2004); Mukherjee and Pennings (2011), inter alia.
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